Can Computers Think? The History and Status of the Debate - Map 1 of 7
问题6
Issue Area: Is the brain a computer?
问题域： 人脑是计算机吗？
The link to the part of the map this discussion is about:
http://www.macrovu.com/CCTWeb/CCT1/CCTMap1Brain.html
1. Alan Turing, 1950, Yes, machines can (or will be able to) think.
A computational system can possess all important elements of human thinking or understanding.
I believe that at the end of the century ... one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.
公共起点
78. (Supporting 1) The biological assumption.
The brain is a machine that can think. Its neurobiological processes are similar to or identical with the information processes of a computer.
Note: More specific versions of the biological assumption argument are represented on Map 3 and on Map 5.
（支持1） 生物学假设。人脑是一个能思考的机器。其神经生物学过程和计算机的信息处理过程相似或相同。
注： 更具体的生物学假设论点见第三和第五图。
79. (Disputing 78) John Searle, 1992 Nothing is intrinsically a digital computer.The syntatic structures that define computers are not intrinsic to physics; they are ascribed to physical systems by humans. So the question,
"Is the brain a digital comptuer?" is ill-defined, because syntax can be ascribed to any sufficiently complex system. Syntactic structures are not just multiply realizable in numerous physical systems, they are universally realizable in any physical system.(It
is too arbitrary of this argument to think a digital computing system has to be implemented at a relatively higher physical level; and it's equally arbitrary to believe that implementation at such a level can yield valuable consequences; as it seems to me
it's because it might have ignored the significance of the computation/thinking (as they are not yet proven equivalent) being implemented with the micro physical structure like in the form of either biochemical nerual processes for a human brain or electronical
and quantum mechanical processes for a modern digital computer and such implementations as these are as so far discovered supported by rather than innumerable and unversal instances as described by the author a very limited set of physical constructs, specifically
biological neural system and silicon-based elecronic system. The fact that physical characteristics of electronics and related materials can be utilized to efficientlyrealize digital computer is largely from a philosophical
view by chance or God's design, rather than merely something that's been ascribed to physics by humans. However the problem is that while whether a brain is a digital computer or not remains a question, it's not safe to say brain is not a digital computer;
that's the main problem this argument has. However the point where it gets challenged by the following arguments is its claim that programs are universally realizable, which is fairly independent of the original statement -- translator)
"The wall can be interpreted as a digital computer."
（反对78） John Searle，1992 没有什么东西从本质上说是一个计算机。 用于定义计算机（行为）的语法结构并非是物理世界所固有的。他们是由人赋予物理系统的属性。所以“人脑是否是计算机”这个问题的定义有问题，因为语法属性可以被赋予任何足够复杂的系统，语法结构并非只是在某些物理系统中可以实现，他们能在任何物理系统中实现。
“墙壁能被看作是一个数字计算机。”
80. (Disputing 79) Jack Copeland, 1993 Programs are not universally realizable.Even if it is true that during some interval of time a pattern of molecule movements on the wall is isomorphic with, for example, the formal
pattern of the WordStar computer program, the wall will not support the same counterfactuals as the program. If the WordStar program had been given different input, it would have behaved differently. But the wall, which was not engineered to implement WordStar,
would not respond to different "input" (that is, a different pattern of molecular organsiation) in the same way. So WordStar is not universally realizable. (If the molecular organsiation and movement is in some way tuned to be
the same as the computer program with isomorphic input and output interfaces deployed, I can't see why the wall can't behave the same way as the program；again essentially it's a problem of who does that and/or by what means -- translator)
coun-ter-fac-tu-al: A conditional (if-then) statement whose "if" clause runs counter to the facts of reality. For example, the statement, "if pigs had wings then they would fly." is a counterfactual, because the "if"
clause--that pigs have wings--is false.
"The wall doesn't support the same counterfactuals as WordStar"
（反驳79） Jack Copeland, 1993 程序并可以被普遍实现。即使在某个时间段，墙上分子运动的图案可以与，比如WordStar（一种早期的计算机字处理程序——编者）的运行模式同构，但墙壁不能支持WordStar的非现实假设。如果WordStar被给予不同的输入，它将以不同方式行动。然而墙壁，由于并没有被工程化设计成WordStar，它不能像程序那样对不同输入“作出”响应（即，一个不同的分组组织图案）。因此WordStar不是可以被普遍实现的。
非现实假设：指一个（如果-就，if-then）条件语句中如果从句的陈述与现实不符的假设情形。例如，陈述，“如果猪有翅膀就能在天上飞。”是一个非现实假设，因为猪有翅膀是假的。
“墙壁不支持WordStar的非现实假设特性”
81. (Disputing 80) John Searle, 1992 Universal realizability is not essential to the argument.Even without universal realizablity, it is still true that syntax is observer relative. And this is enough to show that nothing,
including the brain, is intrinsically a digital computer.
（反驳80） John Searle，1992 普遍实现对这个观点而言（任何事物本质上都不是计算机）不是必须的。即使没有普遍实现性。仍旧可以说语法是相对于观察者的。这已经足够说明任何事物包括人脑本质上都不是数字计算机。
82. (Supporting 79) Formal programs can be realized in multiple physical media.The same formal program could be realized in a digital computer, in a human brain, in beer cans and toilet paper, or in any number of physical
implementations. The program is defined solely in terms of its formal syntatic structure; its mode of physical implementation is irrelevant. (My comments on 79 may more suitably apply to this argument -- translator)
Note: For more multiple realizability arguments, see the "Can functional states generate consciousness?" arguments on Map 6 and sidebar, "Formal Systems: An Overview," on Map 7.
（支持79） 正规程序可以在多种物理介质中实现。同一个正规程序可以在数字计算机，人脑，啤酒罐或卫生纸上实现，以任何数量的物理实现出现。程序只是以其正规的语法结构定义。这与其物理实现的模式是无关的。
83. (Supporting 78) The operation of the brain is computable. Once we have a sufficient understanding of the laws of physics and the structure of the brain, we will be able to precisely simulate the operation of the
brain with a computer.
（支持78） 大脑的工作是可以计算的。 一旦我们掌握了足够的关于大脑物理属性和结构的规律的知识，我们就能用计算机精确地模拟大脑的运行。
84. (Disputing 83) Roger Penrose, 1990 Low-level quantum effects are uncomputable. The biological phenomena that underlie consciousness operate
at a level at which quantum effects could exert an influence. Because quantum effects are not computable, the brain and consciousness may be noncomputatational and nonalgorithmic. (I feel I can never challenge Dr Penrose, and I feel very pleased not to be
able to challenge him -- translator)
（反驳83） 罗杰·彭罗斯，1990
低级（微观层面）量子效应是不可计算的。意识所赖以存在的生物现象是在一个量子物理效应能够起作用的层面上展开的。因为量子效应是不可计算的，人脑和意识应该也是无法计算并且非算法的。
85. (Disputing 84) Keith Stanovich, 1990 And then a miracle happens... Penrose does not explain how quantum effects in the brain might affect consciousness. He simply assumes that quantum effects and the brain are miraculously
related. (This is by no means persuasive -- translator)
"That's an explanation by miracle!"
（反驳84） Keith Stanovich，1990 于是一个奇迹发生了…… 彭罗斯没有解释量子效应如何影响意识。他只是假设了量子效应和脑活动奇迹般地联系起来。
86. (Disputing 84) Herbert Simon, 1995 Quantum effects are irrelevant to symbolic processes.Quantum uncertainties are unimportant to the study of symbolic thought processes, because they occur at a low level of organization and are averaged
out before they can affect higher-level processes. (This one is more competent; however you also need to provide evidence that all conscious processes are symbolic and only the higher-level processes that matter -- translator)
（反驳84） Herbert Simon，1995 量子效应和符号过程是无关的。量子不确定性对符号思考并不重要，因为他们发生在整个组织的最低层面上，它们在影响高层过程之前就被平均化掉了。