tcp_unique_tuple(struct ip_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
const struct ip_nat_range *range,
enum ip_nat_manip_type maniptype,
const struct ip_conntrack *conntrack)
{
static u_int16_t port = 0, *portptr;
unsigned int range_size, min, i;
if (maniptype == IP_NAT_MANIP_SRC)
portptr = &tuple->src.u.tcp.port;
else
portptr = &tuple->dst.u.tcp.port;
/* If no range specified... */
if (!(range->flags & IP_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED)) {
/* If it's dst rewrite, can't change port */
if (maniptype == IP_NAT_MANIP_DST)
return 0;
/* Map privileged onto privileged. */
if (ntohs(*portptr) < 1024) {
/* Loose convention: >> 512 is credential passing */
if (ntohs(*portptr)<512) {
min = 1;
range_size = 511 - min + 1;
} else {
portptr = &tuple->dst.u.tcp.port;
/* If no range specified... */
if (!(range->flags & IP_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED)) {
/* If it's dst rewrite, can't change port */
if (maniptype == IP_NAT_MANIP_DST)
return 0;
/* Map privileged onto privileged. */
if (ntohs(*portptr) < 1024) {
/* Loose convention: >> 512 is credential passing */
if (ntohs(*portptr)<512) {
min = 1;
range_size = 511 - min + 1;
} else {
min = 600;
range_size = 1023 - min + 1;
}
} else {
min = 1024;
range_size = 65535 - 1024 + 1;
}
} else {
min = ntohs(range->min.tcp.port);
range_size = ntohs(range->max.tcp.port) - min + 1;
}
#ifdef IP_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM
/* Add by Eric.Ma 20080922
[Security Issue] Mitigating DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks with iptables */
if(range->flags & IP_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM)
port = net_random();
#endif //IP_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM
for (i = 0; i < range_size; i++, port++) {
*portptr = htons(min + port % range_size);
if (!ip_nat_used_tuple(tuple, conntrack)) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}